Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 36

Issue 1

Article 6

April 1959

Courts - Actions under Laws of Other States - Whether the Courts
of Illinois Will Enforce the Taxing Statutes of Another State
J. Singer

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
J. Singer, Courts - Actions under Laws of Other States - Whether the Courts of Illinois Will Enforce the
Taxing Statutes of Another State, 36 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 71 (1959).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol36/iss1/6

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
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COURTS OF ILLINOIS WILL ENFORCE THE TAXING STATUTES OF ANOTHER
STATE-The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of City of Detroit v.

Gould,' was faced with the necessity of deciding whether the revenue laws
of a sister state ought to be enforced in Illinois. In that case, the city of
Detroit, through its treasurer, brought an action in the circuit court 2 to
recover past due personal property taxes assessed against the defendant's
property located within the corporate boundaries of the plaintiff. The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
revenue laws of a sister state were not entitled to enforcement in Illinois.
The trial court sustained the motion and dismissed the complaint. On a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois,3 the decision was reversed
and the case remanded after that tribunal concluded that the revenue
laws of a sister state should be enforced upon principles of comity, irrespective of the requirements of the full faith and credit clause.
The origin of the concept that one state will not enforce the revenue
laws of a sister state is attributed to Lord Hardwicke in the case of
Boucher v. Lawson.4 In that case, the defendant had contracted to ship
a quantity of gold from Portugal to England for the plaintiff. Upon
arrival in England the defendant refused to deliver the cargo and interposed the defense that the contract was in violation of a Portuguese revenue
law which prohibited the export of gold.

Lord Hardwicke refused to give

effect to the Portugese law, because to do so, he felt, would have detrimental effects on English commerce. In several subsequent cases, the
English courts refused to allow a foreign revenue law to be used as a
defense to an action for breach of commercial contracts. 5 The primary
reason for each holding was to prevent foreign revenue laws from clogging
English trade. However, in none of these cases was there an attempt to
collect a tax due under a foreign statute.
The doctrine made its first appearance in the United States in the
case of Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer wherein a defendant sought to avoid
' 13 Ill. (2d) 297, 146 N. E.

(2d) 61

(1957).

2 It is provided in Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.605; Comp. Laws Mich. (as amended in

1952) § G09.13, that a Michigan municipal corporation is empowered to bring suits
in the courts of other states to collect taxes legally due to Michigan or its political
subdivisions.
3 A direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois was allowed pursuant to Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75.
4 Cas. t. Hard. 85, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (1734).
5 Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowl. 341, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1775) : Planche v. Vletcher,
1 Dougl. 251, 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (1779) : Sharp v. Taylor, 2 Phi. 801, 41 Eng. Rep.
1153 (1849) ; James v. Catherwood, 3 Dow. & Ry. 190 (1823).
6 1 Johns (3 N. Y.) 94 (1806). See also Henry v. Sargeant, 13 N. H. 321, 40 Am.
Dec. 146 (1843), wherein it was stated that a Vermont revenue law would not be
enforced, but no reasons or authority were given to support such a proposition.
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paying a promissory note executed in France on the ground that the note
did not contain stamps as required by French law. The court, however,
held the note to be valid and stated that it did not sit to enforce the
revenue laws of another country. This holding was an application of the
rule as set down by Lord Hardwicke in 1734.
The problem of enforcing the revenue laws of a sister state was
squarely presented to an American court for the first time in the case
of Maryland v. Turner.7 In that case, it was held that the revenue laws
of a sister state would be denied enforcement because a revenue law is
penal. That conclusion was reached because revenue laws are not contractual like ordinary debts but are enforced contributions to the sovereign
and, therefore, penal. The principle thereafter found wide acceptance in
the courts of this country.' For the most part, the foreign revenue laws
were denied enforcement in a state simply because the courts had blindly
applied the rule as set down by Lord Hardwicke as precedent. This rule
was utilized by the Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois in
the earlier case of Cromley v. Dean.9 Since that decision no Illinois reviewing court appears to have had occasion to consider this particular problem and it has been generally accepted that the courts of Illinois would
not enforce the revenue laws of a sister state.
Another objection to the enforcement of the revenue laws of another
state is that a court may feel reluctant to assume the burden of administering an intricate tax system with which it is unacquainted, and thereby
embarrass the taxing state.'" It is believed, however, that this objection is
without merit, for the court would probably have the benefit of prior
interpretations by the courts of the taxing state. Further, it is the taxing
state which is imploring the court to administer its revenue laws; so that
no embarrassment should result when the state itself is present to offer its
views on the proper interpretation of the statute. In addition, the enforcement of the revenue laws of a sister state would not contravene the public
policy of a state unless one adopts the unwarranted conclusion that each
state has a policy against the collection of taxes levied by another state.
The modern view appears to be in favor of enforcing the revenue laws
of a sister state." The most frequently cited case in that connection is the
7 75 Misc. 9, 132 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1911).
8 City of Detroit v. Proctor, 44 Del. 193, 61 A. (2d) 412 (1948); Colorado v.
Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357 (1921). See also the concurring opinion of
Hand, J. in the case of Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. (2d) 600 (1929).
9 177 Ill. App. 67 (1913).
lOBeale, The Conflict of Laws (Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York, 1936), Vol. 3,
§ 610.2, p. 1638.
11 See Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 282 S. W. (2d) 150
(1955) ; Ohio v. Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 234 S. W. (2d) 722 (1950). In Restatement,
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case of State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rodgers,12 wherein an

appellate court of Missouri held that a revenue law is not penal, for a
revenue law defines the extent of the citizen's pecuniary obligation to the
state, in return for the protection afforded him by the state; while the sole
object of a penal law is to punish a wrongdoer. The court then concluded
that a suit for the collection of taxes was an action in the nature of debt for
moneys due, and should be enforceable in a sister state. These conclusions
formed the basis for the result reached by the Supreme Court of Illinois
in the instant case.
After forty-four years of silence in the Illinois law on the subject, the
instant case now exhibits a purpose on the part of the Supreme Court of
Illinois to follow the modern and more enlightened viewpoint. Inasmuch
as the action for the collection of taxes due a sister state is an action in
the nature of debt for moneys due, the simplest ideas of comity would seem
to compel the enforcement of the revenue laws of the sister state. The
contrary doctrine was the product of an earlier commercial world where
two sovereigns were in bitter political and economic competition. Such a
doctrine has no place in a union of states such as the United States. A taxpayer who enjoys the protection of the government of a particular state
should bear his share of the expense of maintaining that government and
should not be allowed to escape this obligation by crossing state lines.
J. SINGER
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UsE-A new question regarding the rights of an
owner of realty to the airspace above his property has been answered by
the Supreme Court of Washington as a result of its decision in the case of
Ackerman v. Port of Seattle.' Therein, owners of both vacant and improved realty located in the approach area of a municipally owned airport
sought to hold the municipality 2 liable for appropriating3 their property
PROPERTY TO A PUBLIC

Conflict of Laws (1948 Supp.), § 610, pp. 174-5, no opinion is expressly stated but
it is said therein that the more desirable result would be to enforce foreign

revenue laws.

12 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S. W. (2d) 919 (1946).
1 - Wash. -, 329 P. (2d) 211 (1959). Mallery, J. filed a dissenting opinion,
concurred in by Hill, C.J., and Donworth and Ott, JJ.
2 The plaintiffs also sought to hold all scheduled airlines using the airport liable,
but the municipality Is the only defendant in this appeal because the airlines have
made a settlement with the plaintiffs.
3 A nuisance theory of liability and a trespass theory of liability were also set
forth in the complaint, but consideration of these theories is outside the scope of

this paper.

